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ABSTRACT
ASSESSING COMPANIES ALLOWANCE FOR DOUBTFUL ACCOUNTS:
EARNINGS MANAGEMENT AND THE RECESSION
The purpose of this thesis is to determine if the economic downturn from 20072009 had any significant influence on company’s ability to estimate bad debt expense,
and to examine if there were any noticeable trends of earnings management. The
estimates that companies use for their estimated allowance for doubtful accounts are
largely unregulated and subjective, and therefore are more easily manipulated. This point
is illustrated in the Statements on Auditing Standards number 57.4 by saying,
“As estimates are based on subjective as well as objective factors, it may
be difficult for management to establish controls over them. Even when
management's estimation process involves competent personnel using
relevant and reliable data, there is potential for bias in the subjective
factors.”
This potential for bias can manifest itself into a manipulation of earnings and also
fraud. This thesis explores the fundamentals behind the reporting of the allowance for
doubtful accounts, write offs, and bad debt expense accounts. In addition, this thesis
utilizes analytics and trend analysis of public companies account balances during the
period from 2005-2009 to examine any possible trends including, but not limited to,
earnings management and fraud.
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Section 1: Introduction
a. Purpose of Allowance for Doubtful Accounts
Whenever goods are sold or services are performed, and the customer does not
pay with cash, an account is created for the receivable amount. This is referred to as
accounts receivable. As complex transactions increase and the reliance on cash is
decreased, the amount of sales on credit is substantial. For example,95% of Kohl’s and
85% of Target’s profits are derived from credit cards. Ideally all of these accounts would
be collected, but in reality some people may default on all or part of their balance.
According to Intermediate Accounting there are two methods for recording these
uncollectible amounts (Kieso, Weygandt and Warfield).
The first of these methods is referred to as the direct write-off method. This
follows that whenever you determine an account to be uncollectible you debit the account
bad debt expense for the amount owed, and credit the respective account receivable for
the same amount. This entry effectively increases your bad debt expense, and decreases
the accounts receivable account. For example, assume management determines that a
$100,000 accounts receivable balance is uncollectible. The correct entry would be to
debit bad debt expense, thereby increasing your expenses, and to credit the respective
accounts receivable, thereby decreasing the accounts receivable balance. The entry is as
follows:
Figure 1: Direct Write-Off Method
Bad Debt Expense

$100,000

Accounts Receivable: Company A $100,000
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The direct write off method is the simpler of the two methods, but it does not
allow for a proper matching of revenues and expenses, and therefore, does not follow
Generally Accepted Accounting Principles(GAAP). To illustrate the inherent flaws of
the direct write off method, consider the following example. If a company were to record
the sale of goods in one year, and then subsequently write off the bad debt as
uncollectible in the next year, the first years income would be overstated and the second
years would be understated.
The second, and the method required by GAAP,is the allowance method. The
allowance method is defined by,
“An estimate is made of the expected uncollectible accounts from all sales made
on account or from the total outstanding receivables. This estimate is entered as
an expense and an indirect reduction in accounts receivable (via an increase in the
allowance account) in the period in which the sale is recorded”(Kieso, Weygandt
and Warfield).
To summarize, an estimate of all future uncollectible accounts is made and
reported as an expense in the current period. This allows for better matching of revenues
and expenses. To illustrate this method a company estimates that $100,000 will be
uncollectible this year. The proper entry is to debit bad debt expense, and credit the
allowance for doubtful accounts for $100,000. The entry is as follows:
Figure 2: Allowance Method
Bad Debt Expense

$100,000

Allowance for Doubtful Accounts $100,000
The allowance for doubtful accounts is a contra asset, and therefore an indirect
reduction to the accounts receivable. The allowance for doubtful accounts is also a
permanent account, and therefore will maintain this $100,000 balance from year to year
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unless otherwise altered. If estimates change and the company later believes that
$110,000 of their outstanding receivables will be uncollectible, they would debit bad debt
expense for an additional $10,000 and credit allowance for doubtful accounts for
$10,000.
If a specific account is deemed uncollectible, then a write off occurs. One would
debit the allowance for doubtful accounts, thereby reducing the total estimated remaining
uncollectible accounts, and credit the specific accounts receivable to reduce the account
balance. This method allows for a better matching of revenues and expenses by reporting
the bad debt expense in the period the revenue was recognized, and also lists receivables
at their estimated net realizable value. Refer to the example below:
Figure 3: Allowance Method Write-Off
Allowance for Doubtful Accounts

$10,000

Accounts Receivable: Company A

$10,000

There are two basic ways that the allowance method can be applied. The first is
referred to as the percentage of sales method. Using this method a company uses past
experience to develop an estimate of what percentage of total sales will be uncollectible
for the year. For example, if the company estimates that 1 percent of all credit sales will
be uncollectible, and reports sales of $500,000 for the year, the correct entry would be as
follows:
Figure 4; Percentage of Sales Method
Bad Debt Expense

$5,000

Allowance for Doubtful Accounts

3

$5,000
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The other basic method is based on the percentage of total receivables. This
method computes the bad debt expense based on total receivables outstanding, and often
employs an aging schedule. Aging schedules are one of the most useful tools for
determining the accuracy of the net realizable value of collectibles because the longer a
debt is outstanding the more likely the customer will default on the debt. A U.S.
Department of Commerce study reports the following as a typical aging schedule:
Figure 5: Accounts Receivable Aging Schedule
Time Elapsed

Percentage Uncollectible

30 Days or Less

4%

31-60 Days

10%

61-90 Days

17%

91-120 Days

26%

Companies will often develop there own aging schedule based on past experience,
and use this aging schedule to compute the amount for bad debt expense and allowance
for doubtful accounts. The aforementioned percentage of sales method is an income
statement based technique, while the percentage of total receivables method is balance
sheet based.
However, as with any estimate, estimating the amount of money that a company
will not collect is a difficult and often times a subjective process. As such, there are no
formal guidelines to calculate the estimate. In today’s complex business environment, the
two basic methods for computing the allowance for doubtful accounts, the percentage of
sales approach and the percentage of receivables methods, are rarely solely employed in
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practice. For example. Sprint Nextel’s 10-k states that, “Our estimate of the allowance for
doubtful accounts considers a number of factors, including collection experience, aging
of the accounts receivable portfolios, credit quality of the subscriber base, estimated
proceeds from future bad debt sales and other qualitative considerations.” In contrast.
Biogen Idee, a biotechnology company with reported revenues in 2010 of over
$3,152,941,000, states that, “Given our historical experiences with bad debts, combined
with our credit management policies and practices, we do not presently maintain
significant bad debt reserves”(Biogen 10-k, 2010).
With no strict guidelines for determining the proper allowance for doubtful
accounts balance, managementjudgment is extremely important in accurately
determining the proper amount to record. This judgment often includes examining
specific clients and industries credit worthiness. For example, after the September 11^
terrorist attacks, the airline industry suffered a serious decline in revenues and were thus
less likely to be able to pay their debts. Similarly, a start up company has no credit
history and may be identified as a bigger risk for default than an established client. The
large reliance on management discretion for developing the account balance, and the
difficulty of auditing a model based on future assumptions, makes the account especially
susceptible to earnings management and fraud. In periods of economic decline, such as
the period from 2007-2009, management is even more likely to participate in earnings
management and fraud(PwC Report, 2009).

5
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b. The Great Recession
Commonly referred to as The Great Recession, the economic downturn beginning
in late 2007 and lasting until 2009 was caused by a multitude of factors. According to
Diamond and Rajan, the three major causes of the recession were “(i) the U.S. financial
sector misallocated resources to real estate, financed through the issuance of exotic new
financial instruments;(ii) a significant portion of these investments found their way,
directly or indirectly, into commercial and investment bank balance sheets;(iii) these
investments were largely financed with short term debt”(Diamond, Rajan). The initial
impetus of the downturn was the housing market crash beginning in early 2007.
The housing bubble began in the early 2000’s after the collapse of the IT bubble.
Investors sought a safer investment, while the world’s central banks lowered interest rates
to encourage individual borrowing. Real estate became the obvious refuge for investors,
and real estate prices soared as a result. As housing production increased, investors began
to securitize, or package together, home mortgages. By packaging lower risk mortgages
with higher risk mortgages, the total risk of default was supposedly effectively lowered.
While the idea was sound, a multitude of factors ultimately led to a gross miscalculation
as to the riskiness of the mortgage-backed securities. This miscalculation was fueled by
low credit requirements for home loans to risky sub-prime borrowers, the belief that
housing prices would continue to increase, and the popularity of home equity loans. By
early 2009 Americans had lost $3 trillion in home equity. The prevalence of mortgagebacked securities utilizing the defaulting home loans as collateral created a domino
effect, and many of the banks and investors holding the mortgage-backed securities were
faced with government bailouts or bankaiptcy(Diamond, Rajan).
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Regardless of the causes of The Great Recession, over eight million jobs were lost
and the 2009 United States GDP annual growth was -2.6%, the worst since The Great
Depression. Figure 6 below show’s the GDP annual growth from 2005-2009(The World
Bank).

Figure 6: GDP Annual Growth %
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Section II: Earnings Management
The responsibility placed on management to accurately determine the allowance
for doubtful accounts can often present a temptation to manage earnings, or to commit
outright fraud. Earnings management has been defined as,
“Earnings management is recognized as attempts by management
to influence or manipulate reported earnings by using specific accounting
methods (or changing methods), recognizing one-time non-recurring
items, deferring or accelerating expense or revenue transactions, or using
other methods designed to influence short-term earnings”(Akers,
Giacomino).
Many companies manage earnings in an attempt to “smooth” earnings in an effort
to appear less volatile and consequently increase their market value. An article in
Management Accounting concluded “We have no doubt that short-term earnings are
being managed in many, if not all companies. Some of these eamings-management
practices can be properly labeled as immoral and unethical.”(Akers, Giacomino).
However, while many companies practice earnings management, there is often a very
fine line between practical timing and outright fraud. This line can be crossed when
companies practice abusive earnings management defined by the SEC as

the use of

various forms of gimmickry to distort a company’s true financial performance in order to
achieve a desired result.”(Akers, Giacomino). Former SEC Chairman Arthur Levitt
identified five examples of “accounting hocus pocus” often coinciding with abusive
earnings management. These included: big bath charges, creative acquisition accounting,
cookie jar reserves, immaterial misapplications of accounting principles, and the
premature recognition of revenue. Two of the most common forms of accounting hocus
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pocus” associated with the allowance for doubtfiil accounts are big bath charges and
cookie jar reserves (Magrath, Lorraine).
Big bath charges and cookie jar reserves present motivation for overstating the
allowance for doubtful accounts. In a big bath, a company experiencing a bad year due to
internal or external deficiencies may grossly overstate the allowance account in one year
to make earnings appear artificially low. After this initial big bath loss, the company’s
future earnings would be artificially high.

While big bath charges often occur when a company or the economy is
performing poorly, cookie jar reserves are created when a company is exceeding
expectations.

Kokoszka describes cookie jar reserves by saying “sometimes labeled
general reserves, rainy day reserves, or contingency reserves — enable companies
to beat earnings estimates by a controlled amount no matter how tlie business
reserves
actually performs. In periods of strong financial peifonnance, cookie jar
enable companies to reduce earnings by overstating reseiwes. over accming
expenses, and using one-time write-offs. In periods of weak linancial
performance, cookie jar reserv'es can be used to increase earnings by reversing
accruals and reserves to reduce cuirent period expenses. This accounting strategy
obviously misleads investors”(Kokoszka)

WorldCom Inc. utilized earnings management in the form of cookie jars reserves
extensively. The company grossly abused reserve reversals by setting aside funds for
lutLire expenses related to litigation, uncollectible receivables, and taxes.(Kokoszka)
Wlien managing earnings, there is also significant motivation to understate the
allowance account. A lower estimated allowance leads to a lower bad debt expense,
thereby increasing revenue and net income for the yeai\ The subjective nature ot the
allowance account allows for management of earnings, which can manifest itself into
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outright fraud.

Earnings management often times starts and consequently continues because of
increased pressures on management to meet analysts’ forecasted objectives. Meeting
these objectives often has a direct impact on stock price, and consequently on the value of
employees’ stock compensation. While this can often lead to fraud, there are invariably
three things that must occur for fraud to take place. These three items are what constitute
the fraud triangle.

Originally developed in the 1950’s by Donald Cressey, tlie Ifaud triangle
continues to be relevant in identifying the tliree conditions necessary for fraud
(Karancher, Stem). The fraud triangle illustrates that in order for a fraud to take place
there must be the incentive or pressure, the opportunity, and the rationalization to commit
fraud (Figure 7). Incentives and pressures can take many different fomis. They usually
include the basic goal to make more money, and may take die fonn of pressures to meet
required debt covenants, a need to inflate stock prices, or simply to preserve one’s Job.
All of these pressures are increased during periods of economic decline. According to
Arens,“Although the financial statements of all companies are potentially subject to
manipulation, the risk is greater for companies in industries where significant judgments
or estimates are involved.

A basic example of an opportunity would be inadequate controls on a cash
register so that an employee could simply steal cash. An opportunity also exists for
management to manipulate allowance for doubtful accounts at their discretion.
Rationalizations may vary, but generally take the fonn of two basic ideas. An employee
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involved with fraud generally feels entitled to the stolen resources, while management
generally rationalizes it by saying that it is a temporary fix and that they will reverse the
fix over time. In the context of allowance for doubtful accounts, the common
rationalization is that it will naturally adjust over time.

Figure 7: Fraud Triangle

Rationalization
Fraud

Opt])ortunities

Triangle

Incentives/Pressures

The prevalence of fraud is widespread, and during poor economic times the
pressures to commit fraud are increased. In PricewaterhouseCoopers Global Economic
Crime Sun’ey 2009, the forensics department of the accounting firm partnered with
INSEAD business school to survey over 3,000 companies in 54 different countries. The
results of the survey were conclusive. According to the survey, nearly one in three
organizations were the victims of economic crime during the period from November
2008 to November 2009. In addition, 40% of companies agreed that they face an increase
risk of fraud during the economic downturn. According to Tony Parton, leader of
PriccvvaicrhouscCoopcrs' forensics practice in London.
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"The global economic downturn has heightened the pressures and incentives to
commit fraud. Economic crime is pervasive, persistent and pernicious. No
orgiuiization and no industry are immune from the threat of fraud. In these tough
limes, the temptation to inflate results or lake part in other forms of financial
statement fraud may overcome ethical values," he added. "In an economic
downturn, financial targets are more difficult to achieve, individuals may feel
pressured, tmd tlieir personal financial position may be threatened by reductions in
pay or layoffs"(PwC Report. 2009).
What is also troubling is that the study found a correlation between the frauds
reported, and the frequency of fraud risk assessments performed. If the amount of fraud
you find increases with the more you look, then the peiwasiveness of fraud may be largely
unknown.
The subjective nature of the allowance for doubtful accounts makes it very
susceptible to earnings management as well as fraud, and has been involved in many
major corporate frauds. With the risk of fraud increasing, it is reasonable to assume that
the allowance for doubtful accounts is also increasing as a vehicle to manage earnings
and commit fraud.

b. HealthSouth
With 2003 revenue of $4.5 billion, HealthSouth was involved in one of the largest
accounting scandals on record. In 2004 it was reported that the organization had
cumulative misstated revenues ranging anywhere from $3.8 to $4.6 billion. SEC Director
of Enforcement Stephen Cutler stated in a March 19, 2003 press release “HealthSouth’s
standard operating procedure was to manipulate the company’s earnings to create the
false impression that the company was meeting Wall Street’s expectations”(Weld,
Bergevin). With respect to the fraud triangle, the incentives and pressures were to meet
analyst’s expectations to maintain an inflated stock price and therefore make more
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money. These pressures were further increased in the late 1990’s when the company was
no longer as profitable. The opportunities were presented in a myriad of accounting tricks
including improper revenue recognition, improper expense recognition, fraudulent
entries, and the use of reserves to inflate income. HealthSouth’s fraud was extensive and
rampant, and it could have been identified by an analysis of the company’s receivables
and its allowance for doubtful accounts.
The percentage of HealthSouth’s accounts receivable written off as uncollectible
was typically high, but that is not atypical for the healthcare industry. However, what was
unique was the rapid changes, ranging from a low of around 10% of receivables
uncollectible to a high of almost 40%. More alarming was the fact that there was no
correlation between uncollectible write offs and beginning allowance for doubtful
accounts. When business was good in 1994 and 1995, HealthSouth established an
unnecessarily large allowance account around 40% of gross receivables (refer to Figure 8
below). This was in an effort to build cookie jar reserves. This larger than needed
beginning allowance allowed the company to report a lower bad debt expense every year.
thereby making net income appear artificially high.
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Figure 8; HealthSouth Bad Debt Detail
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HealthSouth had a very bad year in 1999 with the company’s stock price falling
from a high of $30.12 in the third quarter of 1998 to a low of $4.69 in tlie fouith quarter
of 1999 (www.sec.gov). It was public infonnation that HealthSouth was not going to be
able to meet analyst’s expectations, and HealthSouth decided to utilize a big bath. In
essence , management made a bad year seem worse in an effort to rebuild their cookie jar.
Wliile this data clearly points to HealthSouth’s provision for doubtful accounts as
an early indicator of fraud, it is much easier to point out fraud ex post facto. In light of
the economic downturn, this paper was particularly interested in seeing if there were any
signs of earnings management in the companies examined.
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c. Auditing Allowance for Doubtful Accounts
The SEC requires all public companies to be audited by an independent auditor.
In addition, many private companies are subject to be audited due to various loan
covenants or simply at management’s discretion. The auditor is required to be a certified
public accountant and be licensed by the state. The goal of the auditor is to gather
sufficient appropriate evidence to determine if the financial statements are presented
fairly in accordance with GAAP. As discussed in the Statement on Auditing Standards
110, The auditor has a responsibility to plan and perform the audit to obtain reasonable
assurance about whether the financial statements are free of material misstatement.
whether caused by error or fraud.” So while the goal of an audit is not to uncover fraud,
the auditor should uncover any fraud creating a material misstatement. Once considered
simply a commodity amongst the more lucrative consulting contracts, the passage of the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act(SOX)in 2002 greatly increased the importance of the financial
statement audit.
In the wake of multiple major corporate scandals including Enron, WorldCom,
and Tyco, legislators passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to help hold public companies more
accountable. In addition to requiring an audit on the effectiveness of internal controls,
SOX established criminal penalties for any CEO or CFO who signs off on a fraudulent
report. A CEO or CFO who willingly certifies fraudulent financial statements can face
fines up to $5 million and twenty years in prison (http://www.soxonline.com/basics.html).
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The HeallhSouth fraud was uncovered after Sarbanes-Oxley was in effect, and
CEO Richard Scrushy was the first CEO charged with violating SOX. He was acquitted
of all charges, and the enforceability of SOX was initially questioned.
For most accounts the gathering of the necessary evidence is relatively
straightforward. The auditor may examine documentation to determine the completeness,
accuracy and existence of certain transactions. Other concrete items such as inventory or
equipment may simply require physical examination or observation to determine their
existence and accuracy. However, the audit of a more subjective account, such as the
estimate for allowance for doubtful accounts, becomes more difficult.
Statement on Auditing Standard 57 AU 342(SAS 57 AU 342) provides guidance
on the auditing of accounting estimates, but the lack of strict guidelines leaves the
process largely um*egulated and relies solely on the auditor’s professional judgment.
Sections .03 and .04 illustrate how loose some of the guidelines for auditing estimates
are.
.03 Management is responsible for making the accounting estimates
included in the financial statements. Estimates are based on subjective as
well as objective factors and, as a result,judgment is required to estimate
an amount at the date of the financial statements. Management's judgment
is normally based on its knowledge and experience about past and current
events and its assumptions about conditions it expects to exist and courses
of action it expects to take.

.04 The auditor is responsible for evaluating the reasonableness of
accounting estimates made by management in the context of the financial
statements taken as a whole. As estimates are based on subjective as well
as objective factors, it may be difficult for management to establish
controls over them. Even when management's estimation process involves
competent personnel using relevant and reliable data, there is potential for
bias in the subjective factors. Accordingly, when planning and performing
procedures to evaluate accounting estimates, the auditor should consider.
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with an attitude of professional skepticism, both the subjective and
objective factors.

These two sections introduce some important premises. The first of which is that
the responsibility of determining estimates rests solely with management and that it is a
subjective process. One particularly interesting passage is that it explicitly states that
management factors in past and future events when determining estimates. While this
does not necessitate earnings management, it once again emphasizes the temptation to
use the allowance for doubtful accounts estimate to manage earnings. Section .04
continues to illustrate the elusiveness of the accounts when it says that even management
may not be able to establish controls over the estimates, and that the auditor is only
responsible for determining the reasonableness of the estimates.
Statement .05 further enhances the veil around the allowance account by stating
that while management is responsible for establishing a process for preparing estimates
“the process may not be documented or formally applied.”
The only concrete guidance issued by SAS 57 AU 342 comes in section .1 when it
offers nine procedures to help determine if management’s assumptions about estimates
were reasonable. They are as follows:
a. Identify whether there are controls over the preparation of accounting
estimates and supporting data that may be useful in the evaluation,
b. Identify the sources of data and factors that management used in
forming the assumptions, and consider whether such data and factors are
relevant, reliable, and sufficient for the purpose based on information
gathered in other audit tests,
c. Consider whether there are additional key factors or alternative
assumptions about the factors,
d. Evaluate whether the assumptions are consistent with each other, the
supporting data, relevant historical data, and industry data,
assess
e. Analyze historical data used in developing the assumptions to
whether the data is comparable and consistent with data of the period

17
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under audit, and consider whether such data is sufficiently reliable for the
purpose,
f. Consider whether changes in the business or industry may cause other
factors to become significant to the assumptions,
g. Review available documentation of the assumptions used in
developing the accounting estimates and inquire about any other plans,
goals, and objectives of the entity, as well as consider their relationship to
the assumptions,
h. Consider using the work of a specialist regarding certain assumptions
(section 336, Using the Work of a Specialist),
i. Test the calculations used by management to translate the assumptions
and key factors into the accounting estimate.
While these steps help to ascertain the reasonableness of the accounts, they are
largely subjective and they still fail to determine if management is using the allowance
account to manage earnings.

18

18

Neyhart

19

Section III: Assessing Allowance for Doubtful Accounts
According to Weld and Bergevin,“A detailed analysis of credit sales can help
unearth abusive earnings management,even if the primary accounts create an illusion of
successful performance. This technique requires an investigation of all of the accounts
comprising net receivables, as well as their interrelationships, in order to identify
potential problems." An attempt was therefore made to effectively analyze net
receivables to see if any trends, including earnings management, were present during the
economic downturn.
Ten companies were selected from each of five different industry groups. The
groups chosen were based on Standard Industry Classification Codes(SIC Codes). SIC
codes were deemed to be an appropriate factor to choose the five groups because they
effectively segregate companies based on their primary business, and consequently the
primary sector of the economy they affect. According to www.siccode.com,
“SIC Codes are four digit numerical codes assigned by the U.S.
government to business establishments to identify the primary business of
the establishment. The classification was developed to facilitate the
collection, presentation and analysis of data; and to promote uniformity
and comparability in the presentation of statistical data collected by
various agencies of the federal government, state agencies and private
organizations.”
The Codes are divided into ten divisions: A. Forestry and Fishing, B. Mining, C.
Construction, D. Manufacturing, E. Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas, And
Sanitary Services, F. Wholesale Trade, G. Retail Trade, H. Finance, Insurance and Real
Estate, I. Services, and J. Public Administration. Each of these ten divisions is then
further subdivided into various major groups. The major groups are numbered 01-99 and
represent the first two numbers of the SIC code. Each major group is then divided into
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industry groups numbered 1-9, which represents the third number of the SIC code. The
fourth number of the SIC code represents the classification within the industry group
(www.siccode.com).
Groups were chosen based on SIC codes to determine if there were any trends in
any particular sectors of the economy, and if any of these trends were correlated with the
recession. In particular focus were any trends that may have increased the pressure for
fraud or earnings management. The groups were chosen in an attempt to minimize any
correlation between groups, and to incorporate as many facets of the economy as
possible. The five groups chosen for this research were initially filtered by major group,
and were further segregated based on industry groups in an effort to narrow the scope of
each group. The decision to further narrow the scope of some groups was based on the
size of the pool of eligible companies. A company was deemed eligible if it had filed a
10-k with the SEC for the years 2005-2009 and had reported bad debt expense, allowance
for doubtful accounts, and write-offs for each of the five years in question. The five years
were chosen in an effort to capture data from before and during the recession.
Selections of individual companies were made from the eligible pool of
companies using haphazard selection. In an effort to cover the largest companies,
selections were targeted using revenue as an indicator of size. Refer to the charts below
for the groups chosen, and the companies selected from each group.
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Figure 9: Group 1: Computers
Group 1: Computers
Division D: Manufacturing
Major Group: 35 Industrial and Commercial Machinery and Computer Equipment
Industry Group: 357 Computer and Office Equipment

Selection
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

SIC Code
3571
3571
3571
3570
3570
3572
3572
3576
3576

Company Name
Dell

10

3577

Xerox

2009 Revenue
(in millions) Stock Ticker
$55,908 DELL
$13,931 AAPL
$11,070 JAVA
$86,696 HPQ
$5,222 LXK
$9,664 EMC
$40 LCRD
$24,801 CSCO

Apple
Sun Microsystems
Hewlett Packard
Lexmark
EMC Corporation
Lasercard Corporation
Cisco Systems
QLOGIC Corp.

$494
$15,701

QLGC
XRX

Figure 10: Group 2: Wholesale Trade
Group 2: Wholesale Trade
Division F: Wholesale trade
Major Group: 50 Wholesale Trade-durable Goods
Industry Group: 503 Lumber & 506 Electrical Goods

Selection

2009 Revenue Stock
(in millions) Ticker

#

SIC
Code

11

5030

12
13

5030
5031

14
15

5063
5063

16

5063

17
18

5063
5063

EnerSys
Graybar Electric Company
Inc.
Houston Wire and Cable
Co.
Wesco International Inc.

19

5064

Craftmade International Inc

20

5065

Audiovox Corp.

Company Name
Beacon Roofing Supply Inc.
Huttig Building Products
Inc.
BlueLinx Holdings INC.
Anixter International Inc.

21

$1,734

BECN

$455
$1,646

HBPI
BXC

$4,982
$1,579

AXE
ENS

$1

Private

$255
$4,624

HWCC
WCC

$150
$551

CRFT
VOXX

I
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Figure 11: Group 3: Food and Kindred Products
Group 3: Food and Kindred Products
Division D: Manufacturing
Major Group: 20 Food and Kindred Products
Industry Group: 201 Meat, 202 Dairy & 203 Canned Fruits and Specialties

#

Selection

SIC
Code

21

2000

2009 Revenue
(in millions)

Company Name

Stock
Ticker

$12,079

CAG

$2,601

FLO

$40,386

KFT

$12,881

SLE

22

2000

Conagra Foods Inc.
Flowers Foods Inc.

23

2000

Kraft Foods Inc.

24

2000

Sara Lee

25

2011

Hormel

$6,534

HRL

26

2011

Smithfield Foods Inc.

$11,203

SFD

27

2024

Dean Foods Co.

$11,158

28

2033

Del Monte Foods Co.

29

2033

Smucker J M CO

$4,605

SJM

30

2033

Seneca Foods Corp.

$1,280

SENEA

$3,740

DF
DLM

Figure 12: Group 4: Communications
Group 4: Communications
Division E: Transportation, Communications, Electric, Gas, And Sanitary Services
Major Group: 48 Communications
Industry Group: 481 Telephone, 483 Radio and Television & 484 Cable Television

Selection

#

SIC
Code

2009 Revenue
(in millions)

Stock
Ticker

31

4813

Company Name
AT&T Inc.

32

4813

Cincinnati Bell Inc.

33

4813

Verizon

34

4812

MetroPCS Communications
Inc.

$3,481

PCS

4832

Clear Channel
Communications

$2,698

CCO

35

$123,018
$1,336
$107,808

T
CBB
VZ

36

4832

Cumulus Media Inc.

$256

CMLS

37

4832

Saga Communications

$121

SGA

38

4841

Comcast Corp.

$35,756

CMCSA

39

4841

DirecTV Financing Co

$21,565

DTV

40

4841

DISH Network Corp.

$11,664

DISH
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Figure 13: Group 5: Drugs
Group 5: Drugs
Division D: Manufacturing
Major Group; 28 Chemicals and Allied Products
Industry Group: 283 Drugs

#

Selection

SIC
Code

41

2834

42

2834

43

2834

44

2836

45

2834

46
47

2834
2834

48

2834

49

2836

50

2834

2009 Revenue Stock
(in millions) Ticker
$5,090 MYL

Company Name
Mylan Laboratories Inc.
Bristol Myers Squibb Co.
Genentech

$18,808

BMY

$13,418

DNA

Amgen Inc.
Johnson and Johnson

$14,642

AMGN

$61,897

JNJ

Forest Laboratories

$4,112

FRX

Watson Pharmaceuticals

$2,793

WPI

Allergan
Gilead Sciences Inc.

$4,504

AGN

$7,011

GILD

King Pharmaceuticals

$1,777

KG

Note: All company information was obtained from www.sec.gov based on SIC Code
information found at www.osha.gov.
After the selection of the companies, the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission online Electronic Data-Gathering, Analysis, and Retrieval system(EDGAR)
was utilized to view the 10-k for each company. The 10-k is the annual comprehensive
report required by the SEC for all publicly traded companies. It includes an overview of
the companies business and financial position and audited financial statements
(http://www.sec.gov/answers/formlOk.htm).
Many common numbers presented on financial statements, such as revenue or
assets, are now reported using an XBRL(extensible business reporting language) and
data for multiple companies can be pulled simultaneously using a database such as
Compustat. However, the discrete reporting of bad debt expense, and allowance for
doubtful accounts is not required by GAAP for any of the major financial statements, and
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is therefore often presented as supplementary information. This information is generally
found towards the bottom of the 10-k in a section referred to as Schedule Two,or under a
section 14 Valuation and Qualifying Accounts. In addition to often being located in
different places on the 10-k, the accounts in question are not universally referred to as
allowance for doubtful accounts, bad debt expense, and write-offs. Other common terms
include provision for doubtful accounts, additions charged to bad debt provision, and
amounts charged to income statement. While the terminology was different for many
companies, it was always possible to ascertain the intention of the account name by
tracing the ending allowance amount to the beginning allowance amount.
After locating the information on the 10-k, the beginning allowance for doubtful
accounts, bad debt expense, write offs and the ending allowance for doubtful accounts
were recorded for the years 2005-2009. The accounts in question are reported for the
cuiTent year and two years prior. As such, the most recent 10-k was examined to gather
data for 2009, 2008, and 2007 and an earlier 10-k was examined to gather the data for
2006 and 2005.
Based on guidance Riley and Pasework’s article “Assessing the Allowance for
Doubtful Accounts”, the first analytic performed was to compare a company s bad debt
expense as a percentage of the company’s write offs. Theoretically, a company s bad debt
expense for the year should match the write-offs for the same period. While this is nearly
impossible to predict accurately, it is reasonable to assume that over time the ratio of bad
debt expense to write-offs should be close to 1. A ratio over 1 means that a company is
overestimating its bad debt expense, and the company is potentially creating a cookie-jar
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reserve. A ratio less than 1 means that a company may be underestimating its collection
problems, and possibly trading current performance for future losses.
The mean and the standard deviation were then calculated for the five years to
determine how consistent a company’s reporting was. The closer the mean was to 1, the
better the average matching of bad debt expense to write offs was. The lower the standard
deviation, then the more consistent the company’s reporting was to the mean. This ratio
was calculated for each individual company as well as for each industry group as a
whole. As an added indicator the percentage change from year to year was also calculated
to see if there were any isolated movements in response to the economic downturn.
The second analytic performed was to compare beginning allowance for doubtful
accounts to write-offs. Dividing the beginning allowance for doubtful accounts by write
offs for the year allows one to determine if the predicted allowance was adequate for the
subsequent years write offs. A low ratio may indicate that the company did not have
enough provision for doubtful accounts, while a high ratio may indicate that the company
was accumulating cookie-jar reserves. The mean and standard deviation were also
calculated for the ratio to measure volatility. The mean was calculated to establish a
reasonable baseline for the entire period in an effort to see if there were any specific years
with an abnormal ratio. The standard deviation represents the overall volatility. A low
standard deviation signals a relatively stable estimate, while a high standard deviation
signals increased volatility in the estimate. A highly volatile BADA/WO ratio may
indicate a poor job at predicting bad debt expense or earnings management. These
indicators are especially indicative if they are concurrent with the economic downturn.
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The final ratio examined was write offs as a percentage of total accounts
receivable. This ratio was used in Anatomy ofa Financial Fraud: A Forensic
Examination of HealthSouth to spotlight HealthSouth’s earnings management. This ratio
should be fairly stable, and volatility may represent changes in the economic climate or
earnings management. This ratio will identify if a particular company or group
consistently writes off more bad debts. A high ratio may indicate relaxed credit
requirements for customers, or simply a characteristic of a particular industry. One would
expect the ratio to increase during the period of economic decline due to decreased credit
sales and increased collection problems. In addition, any sudden or sporadic changes in
the ratio may be an indicator of earnings management.
In response to the housing crash, the expectation was that the Wholesale Trade
segment would experience the most volatility. The rest of the groups were assumed to
have responded to the economic turn in relative correlation to their elasticity. The order
of expected volatility from the most elastic to the least elastic proceeded as follows:
Wholesale Trade, Computers, Communication,Dmgs and finally Food and Kindred
Products.
Figure 13: Analytics Utilized
Analytic Utilized
1. BDE/WO

Expectation
Should equal 1 over time.

2. BADA/WO

The closer to 1, the better at
predicting bad debt expense for
the year.

3. WO/Total AR

Should be stable from period to
period.
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Section IV: Ratio Analysis
(L BDEAVO
At first ghmce. all of the segment means are close to 1. signaling that overall the
companies are good at predicting their bad debt expense (Figure 14). When analyzing tlie
BDE/WO ratio by segment totals (Figure 15). the four most apparent occurrences are tlie
increases in 2008 by the Food and Kindred Products and the Computer segments, tlie
apparent volatility of the Wliolesale Trade segment, the relatively stable ratio from the
Communications and Drugs segments, and the general decline of every segment from
2008-2009. These four trends are discussed in detail below.
Figure 14: BDEA\^0 Mean
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Figure 15: BDEAVO By Segment Totals

BDE/WO By Segment Totals
2
^ 1.75
1.5 “#=»Computer
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1
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0.75
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^ 0
2005
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Upon examination of the Food and Kindred Products segment’s BDEAVO
standard deviations, the steady increase from 2005 to 2008 may be attributable to three
outliers with the highest standard deviations: Hormel, Smuckers and Smithfield (Figure
16).
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Figure 16: BDEAVO Standard Deviation Food and Kindred Products
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However, after correcting for these three apparent outliers, the trend maintains for
the group (Figure 17). From this, we can conclude that the Food and Kindred Products
increased their expectations for bad debt expense in relation to their write offs in response
to the economic downturn in 2007 and 2008.
Figure 17: BDEAVO: Modified Food

BDE/WO: Modified Food

Total for Modified
Segment
■“8S“TotalforSJA, HRM&
SFD
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However, the apparent spike presented by the Computer segment in 2008 was in
fact a result of two outliers, QLogic and Hewlett Packard (Figure 18). This may be a clear
indicator of the two companies creating a cookie-jar reserve in response to the uncertain
economic climate.
Figure 18: BDEAVO Computers

BDE/WO Computers
5
Dell
4

Apple

V

\

y

^

*=:#=Sun Microsystems
Hewlett Packard

2

<==*«=» Lexmark
«=3=*EMC Corporation

1
Lasercard Corporation

0
2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

-QLOGIC Corp.

-1

i

Cisco Systems

-2

Xerox
Total for Segment

Upon further investigation, what is also troubling is the apparent volatility represented by
the standard deviation for Lasercard Corporation (Figure 19).
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Figure 19: BDEAVO Standard Deviation: Computers

BDE/WO STD Computers
5
4.5
4 ..
3.5
3
2.5
2
1.5
0.5
0 —

.uL

■ til

jj

J BDE/WO Standard
deviation

VV vV/A V
V

The high volatility represented by QLogic and Hewlett Packard is explained by
their spike in 2008, however, the wild volatility experienced by Lasercard Corp. requires
more examination. Upon further investigation, no trends become readily apparent for
Lasercard’s ratio. Review of the percentage change from year to year of the detail reveals
that either Lasercard is involved in extensive earnings management, its collections are
highly unpredictable, or management does a poor job at estimating bad debt expense
(Figure 20).
Figure 20: Lasercard BDE/WO % Change Detail
Lasercard Corp. BDE/WO % Change Detail
BDE %
Change
Write Offs % Change BDE/WO % Change
20082009
20072008
20062007
20052006

-51%

-97%

1758%

50%

218%

-45%

-6%

27%

-26%

45%

-89%

1222%
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After excluding the three outliers, Lasercard Corp, QLogic and Hewlett Packard,
the ratio is much more stable for the Computer segment(Figure 21). From this we can
conclude that the Computer segment as a whole did not experience a significant change
in estimating its bad debt expense in response to the economic downturn.
Figure 21: BDEAVO Modified Computers
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The next noticeable trend when examining the BDEAVO by segment totals is the
volatility shown by the Wholesale Trade segment(Figure 22). This is to be expected,
because the Wholesale Trade segment suffered the direct consequences of the housing
market crash.
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Figure 22: BDEAVO Wholesale Trade
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However, after correcting for the two most volatile companies based on standard
deviation, EnerSys and Houston Wire and Cable, the segment seems much more stable
(Figure 23, 24).
Figure 23: BDEAVO Standard Deviation Wholesale Trade

!
I

BDE/WO STD Wholesale Trade
1.4
1.2

I

1 t0.8
0.6
0.4

T

a

0.2 i

0

Q

jA

f

ca BDE/WO Standard

deviation

\^°

33

1
Neyhart

34

Figure 24: BDEAVO Modified Wholesale Trade
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After correcting for the two outliers, the segment becomes much less volatile.
This may be an indicator of poor management or earnings management by EnerSys and
Houston Wire and Cable Company.
The third trend found in the BDE/WO Segment Total graph is the relative
stability of the Drugs and Communications segments. It appears that the Drugs segment
is consistently the best predictor of bad debt expense as its ratio is consistently near 1. It
also appears that the Communications segment consistently underestimates its bad debt
expense as its ratio hovers around .75 (Figure 15).
However, it appears that the Dmg’s segment is kept near 1 only because of
offsetting results. As shown in Figure 25 below, six of the companies have standard
deviations over 1, while the other four are close to zero. In addition, Mylan Laboratories
standard deviation is an immediate red flag. From this, it can be concluded that there is
no correlation between the Dmg Segment and accurately predicting bad debt expense.
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Figure 25: BDEAVO Standard Deviation: Drugs
BDE/WO Standard Deviation
Standard Deviation
Company
35.9173904
Mylan Laboratories Inc.
3.384853005
Watson Pharmaceuticals
2.857738033
Amgen Inc.
2.592870817
Forest Laboratories
2.051795392
Allergan
1.663535488
Johnson and Johnson
0.31320844
King Pharmaceuticals
0.027035513
Total for Segment
Genentech
0.024684414
Gilead Sciences Inc.
0.024363967
0.018322002
Bristol Myers Squibb Co.

While it was merely a coincidence that the Dmg segment’s BDEAVO ratio was
consistently near I, it does appear that the Communications segment was better at
predicting its bad debt expense. As seen in Figure 26, only one company, MetroPCS has
a standard deviation over .5.

Figure 26: BDEAVO Standard Deviation Communications
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While the standard deviation confirms that companies in tlie Communications
segment were more accurate at predicting their bad debts. Figure 26 clearly shows one
outlier: MetroPCS Communications. MetroPCS’s extremely high BDE/WO ratio in
2006-2008 is a clear warning sign for tlie creation of a cookie jar(Figure 27).
Figure 27: BDEAVO Communications

BDE/WO Communications
"ff"-"AT&T Inc.
Cincinnati Bell Inc.
■=*=» Verizon
MetroPCS Communications Inc.
Clear Channel Communications
Cumulus Media Inc.
Saga Communications
.=«=. Comcast Corp.
- - ’ DirecTV Financing Co
DISH Network Corp.

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

The final trend when analyzing the BDEAVO ratio by segment totals is the
general decline in the ratio from every segment in 2008. Figure 28 below shows the
percentage change from year to year.

36

36

Neyhart

37
1
I

Figure 28: BDEAVO % Change: Segment Totals
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A reasonable assumption would be that companies across all segments had to
increase their write-offs in 2009 due to collection problems. However, detailed
examination of the numbers in Figure 29 reveals that not to be the case.
Figure 29: BDE vs. Write-Offs % Change

Segment
Computer
Wholesale Trade
Food and Kindred
Products
Communications
Drugs

% Change in
°/o Change in BDE Write-Offs 20082008-2009
2009
-7%
-27%
-49%
-56%
39%
-20%
3%

17%
1%
-2%

As this is a trend across all companies, it is considered a general response to the
recession. Companies either overestimated their bad debt expense in 2008,or were
underestimating their collection problems in 2009. If in fact companies were
underestimating their collection problems and trading current performance for future
losses, then this would be an indicator of widespread earnings management.
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In conclusion, the BDE/WO ratio revealed multiple trends and multiple signs of
either earnings or poor management. It can be concluded that the Food and Kindred
Products companies increased their expectations for bad debt expense in relation to their
write offs in response to the economic downturn in 2007 and 2008. The ratio also
revealed that the Computer segment’s ratio remained relatively stable throughout the
period, with the exception of the three outliers: Hewlett Packard, QLogic, and Lasercard.
The apparent volatility shown by the Wholesale Trade segment was expected, however,
after adjusting for two outliers, the segment appeared relatively accurate at predicting its
bad debt expense. The correlation between companies in the Dmgs segment and
accurately predicting their bad debt was deemed to be nonexistent after further
examination, while the Communications segment companies did appear to be better able
to accurately predict their bad debt expense. Finally, all industries experienced a decrease
in their ratio from 2008 to 2009, indicating a general response to the recession.

h, BADAAVO
When analyzing the B ADAAVO ratio by segment totals, three things stand out as
peculiar (Figure 30). The nominal ratio reported for the Drugs and Communications
segments,the drastic spike in 2008 reported by the Food and Kindred Products group,
and the general downward trend by the Computer and Wholesale Trade segments all raise
suspicion. Further investigation of these three issues is discussed below.
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Figure 30; BADAAVO by Segment Totals
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Upon further investigation, the entire Drugs segment is maintained artificially low
due to Bristol Myers Squibb, Genentech’s and Gilead Sciences Inc. abnormally high
write-offs compared to beginning allowance for doubtful accounts.
Figure 31; BADAAVO Drugs; Modified
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After removing the three outliers, the data seems to trend more in line with
Computers and Wholesale Trade (Figure 31). This includes a spike in 2007, before a
steady decrease. It is clear from this graph that the low ratio for the Drugs group is
distorted by the three outliers Bristol Myers Squibb, Genentech and Gilead Sciences Inc.
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Excluding other factors, the abnormally low ratio for the three outliers could be a red flag
for earnings management.
In contrast, further examination of the low ratio reported by the Communications
group reveals tlie average ratio is typically low (Figure 32). However, it is clear that
MetroPcs Communications experienced some drastic changes.
Figure 32: BADAAVO Communications Detail

AT&T Inc.
Cincinnati Bell
Inc.
Verizon
MetroPCS
Communications
Inc.
Clear Channel
Communications
Cumulus Media
Inc.
Saga
Communications
Comcast Corp.
DirecTV Financing
Co
DISH Network
Corp.
Total for Segment

BADA/WO Communications Detail
2009
2008
2007
0.682795699
0.483859525 0.673350923

2006
2005
1.179538616 0.902614968

0.779220779
0.557134399

1.091603053
1
0.419527079 0.639006095

0.909574468 1.142857143
0.623858795 0.644230769

1.438178634

19.78231293

9.375

1.710696339

1.81484375

1.250661529

1.541581992

1.448115523

1.732604374

1.403945264

0.592109662

0.481161695

0.63526333

0.636821192 0.662665666

1.018060837
0.475

1.296587927 1.311864407
0.414187643 0.398477157

1.527817404 1.800362976
0.519685039 0.529166667

-0.072562358

-0.102631579 0.118181818

-0.159235669 0.184971098

0.137173011

0.143871676

0.146767994

0.176117259

0.172331588

0.543865873

0.483054799 0.577308487

0.566874155

0.636046011

Upon further investigation, MetroPCS Communications generally increased its
beginning allowance for doubtful accounts throughout the recession, which is to be
expected. However, the write-offs are peculiar (Figure 33).
Figure 33: MetroPCS BADAAVO Detail

2009
2008
2007
2006
2005

MetroPCS Communications Inc.
BADA
Write-offs
% Change
% Change
4.106
41%
2.855
1842%
2.908
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0.147
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In 2008 MeiroPCS increased its BADA almost 50%, while reducing its write-offs
by 30%, contributing to the drastic increase in its 2008 BADA/WO ratio. More alarming,
MetroPCS increased its write offs in 2009 by over 1000%. Without an alternate
explanation, this is a clear case of earnings management. Management reduced their
write-offs in an effort to improve performance in 2007 and 2008, and then took a big bath
charge in 2009.
The second peculiar trend when reviewing the results for segment totals in Figure
30 is the drastic increase in the Food and Kindred Products ratio in 2008. Once again, this
drastic increase was an isolated trend related to two outliers: Seneca Foods Corp. and
Hoimel. As one can see from Figure 34, the ratios for Hormel and Seneca Foods Corp.
rapidly spiked from 2007-2008 while the rest of the segment stayed relatively stable.
Figure 34: BADAAVO Food and Kindred Products
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As shown in Figure 35 below, Hormel drastically reduced its write-offs in 2008
creating the sudden jump in the ratio. This may have been in an effort to preserve 2008
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earnings. In addition, it drastically increased its 2009 write offs, a clear indicator of a big
bath. The increase related to Seneca seems to have occurred because the company
decreased its B ADA while greatly increasing its write offs (Figure 36). This may be a big
bath, or just a natural response to tlie deteriorating economy.
Figure 35: Hormel BADAAVO Detail

2009
2008
2007
2006
2005

Hormel
BADA
Write offs
% Change
% Change
3.144
-1%
0.901
670%
3.18
-19%
-83%
0.117
3.922
-29%
0.672
237%
5.518
20%
-0.49
63%
4.6
-1.31

Figure 36; Seneca Foods Corp.BADAAVO Detail

2009
2008
2007
2006
2005

Seneca Foods Corp.
BADA
Write offs
% Change
% Change
0.426
-7%
0.89
1335%
0.457
-9%
577%
0.062
0.504
13%
89%
-0.013
0.445
-29%
-0.119
69%
0.625
-0.388

The final trend attributable to BADAAVO ratio is the general downward trend by
the Computer and Wholesale Trade segments after 2007. After accounting for the
outliers, the modified Drugs segment also exhibits this downward trend. Figures 37 and
38 below show that almost every company in the two segments experienced the
downward trend. In fact, the downward trend would be even more pronounced for the
Computer segment if it were not for Apple and Sun Microsystems.
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Figure 37: BADAAVO % Change: Computers
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Figure 38: BADAAVO % Change: Wholesale Trade
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As the ratio is comprised of two variables, it is important to determine which, if
either, of the two factors caused the downward trend. Figure 39 below clearly shows that
it was an increase in the write-offs from 2007-2008 responsible for the downward trend.
This is to be expected, as a decrease in the economic climate should see a coiTelating
increase in write-offs. As this trend was not present in the Communications or Food
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segments, it can be concluded that those two segments are less responsive to the economy
with respect to their write-offs.
Figure 39: BADAAVO Detail: Computers and Wholesale Trade
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In conclusion, the BADA/WO ratio revealed multiple trends and possible cases of
earnings management. The Drug segment was maintained artificially low due to three
outliers: Bristol Myers Squibb, Genentech and Gilead Sciences Inc, The three outliers
may be severely underestimating their bad debt expense, and may also be utilizing
earnings management. The Communication segment as a whole maintains a lower
BADA/WO ratio, while MetroPCS exhibited wild fluctuations and exhibited signs of
earnings management before taking a big bath in 2009. The apparent volatility of The
Food and Kindred Products segment turned out to be merely the result of two outliers:
Seneca Foods and Hormel. Both of these companies raise red flags for possible earnings
management. Finally, the downward trend shown by the Computers and Wholesale Trade
segments in 2008 was the result of increased write-offs, a predictable consequence of the
recession.
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c. WO/Total AR
The final ratio analyzed was tlie write offs as a percentage of total accounts
receivable. While examining the percentage of write offs to total accounts receivable two
trends become readily apparent (Figure 40). The first is tliat the Communications and
Drugs segments experienced a drastic increase in write offs from 2007 to 2008. This is to
be expected as a decline in the economy means that credit sales should generally decline
and customers are less likely to pay their debts. The second trend, however, is that the
ratio for the Wholesale Trade, Food and Kindred Products and Computer segments
appear to remain relatively stable. This may lead one to believe that the Communications
and Dmgs segments were more involved in earnings management, or were more
influenced by the economic downturn.
Figure 40: WO/Total AR:Segment Totals
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However, this initial diagnosis is simply a problem of scale. After examining the
percentage change from year to year, a much clearer trend presents itself. As Figure 41
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below clearly illustrates, every segment experienced an increase in their ratio at the peak
of the recession. As this spike is attributable to every industry, it is therefore more
indicative of general economic factors, including a combination of increased collection
problems and decreased credit sales as opposed to earnings management. Furthermore,
the spike presented in this analytic corresponds with the predicted volatility based on the
housing market crash and the relative elasticity of each segment.
Figure 41: WO/Total AR:Segment Totals % Change
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As the ratio consists of two variables, it was deemed necessary to see if either of
the two factors played a significant role in the spike in the ratio, or if it was a
combination of both factors. Figures 42 and 43 clearly show that while accounts
receivable remained relatively stable from year to year, the write-offs increased
dramatically from 2007-2008. This establishes that the spike in the ratio in 2008 was due
to increased write-offs, not a decrease in accounts receivable. This is peculiar, because
while one would expect to see an increase in write-offs in conjunction with a recession.
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one would also expect to see a correlating decrease in accounts receivable. This may be
indicative of widespread earnings management.

Figure 42: % Change in AR: Segment Totals
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Figure 43: % Change in WO: Segment Totals
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The segment total chart. Figure 40, is also a clear indicator of industry practices.
It is apparent that the Communication and Drug segments experience much higher write
offs in comparison to the other three segments.
However, while the general trend across the segments is a sudden increase in
response to the recession, it does not mle out the possibility of earnings management
among individual companies. Further investigation reveals that two Drug companies in
particular, Genentech and Bristol Myers Squibb, had wild fluctuations during the period
(Figure 44). Without additional evidence, this appears to be a clear warning sign of
earnings management.
Figure 44: WO/Total AR:Drugs
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In conclusion, the WO/Total AR analytic revealed that every industry experienced
a drastic spike from 2007-2008 in response to the economic downturn. It also showed
that certain industries generally operate with a higher write offs to total accounts
receivable ratio. However, while there is a clear trend across industries, it does not mle
out the possibility of earnings management by individual companies.
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Section IV: Conclusion
In conclusion, a detailed analysis of companies reporting bad debt expense and
estimates for allowance for doubtful accoimts identified that the recession had a direct
impact on companies' reporting of the accounts. However, this impact varied from
industry to industry. Furthermore, this thesis confirmed that such analysis is a useful tool
in identifying earnings management.
The analysis revealed tliat many companies showed warning signs of earnings
management. However, it should be noted that there are additional factors that may have
affected the analysis. For example, any mergers or acquisitions during the time period
could have had a substantial impact on individual companies results.
Because the accounts rely on estimates and subjective factors, management can
easily manipulate them in order to manage earnings. This manipulation is especially
prevalent in times of economic decline. It is clear that current auditing standards do not
offer enough guidance for examining the accounts, and do not necessitate strict enough
standards for companies reporting. While outside the scope of this thesis, in light of the
move to
widespread warning signs of earnings management found in this thesis, a
develop stricter reporting standards for allowance for doubtful accounts should be
developed.
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